The German parachute troop organization is continually expanding. For nearly two
years, however, there have been no major air-borne operations. Since the campaign
in Crete, German parachute troops have chiefly been employed as infantry, and today
they are encountered more and more often in this role. This should not be
interpreted as meaning that the German paratrooper is now merely an infantryman
who has received training in parachute operations. Actually, he is recruited and
trained as a specialist. While infantry tactics are a basic part of the
instruction, special emphasis is placed on training for surprise attacks
directed toward securing and holding small vital areas until the arrival
of reinforcements. Instruction in demolition work and guerrilla warfare is also included.
Originally, the Ju 52 transport was used both in training and in actual operations, but
recent reports indicate that the He 111 bomber is being used for training purposes. Jumps
from altitudes as low as 275 feet were made from the Ju 52; however, the higher speed
of the bomber makes it hazardous to jump from altitudes under 600 feet. This has
necessitated a revision of landing tactics. When the members of a machine-gun unit
jumped in quick succession from a Ju 52, they were able to land fairly close
together, whereas the same men jumping from a bomber are likely to land about
250 feet apart—altogether too great a distance for a tactical unit.
The new jumping procedure is interesting. The aircraft fly in close vees of
three, with the center plane slightly higher than the other two. A tactical
group is distributed among the three planes: No. 1 man in left-hand plane, No. 2 man in
the center plane, and No. 3 man in the plane on the right. When these three men
jump, they are separated only by the distances between the belly turrets of the
bombers, and therefore are likely to land approximately 35 feet apart. This
enables them to assemble and go into action much more quickly.
It should be noted that He 111's carrying paratroops may be accompanied by
active bombers of the same type, and that carrier identification by ground
defenses may therefore be difficult. The possibility of surprise is also
increased.
A further innovation involves smoke. The escorting bombers may be expected, at
times, to fly ahead and drop high explosive and smoke bombs, creating a wall
of smoke into which the carriers fly and drop their troops.
In the early stages of paratroop operations, it was considered very difficult
for a man to land safely if he carried any weapons other than an automatic pistol
and a large jackknife, although the men in the first platoon to land were equipped
with one to four hand grenades, and every fourth man carried a light automatic
carbine. Accordingly, rifles, ammunition, light field guns, and mortars were
dropped in separate containers, and in loads up to 260 pounds. It is now
reported that, in addition to their usual equipment, parachutists jump with
light machine guns, machine carbines, or rifles, and that they have drum magazines
strapped to their waists. The light machine gun is wrapped either in a blanket
or in a special zippered case, and may be put into action immediately. (In some
instances a belt of ammunition is adjusted in the machine-gun feeder before the
jump.) The separate containers are still used, of course, for additional
ammunition and the heavier types of equipment.
Ground-air communications have been improved. Upon landing, the signal section, which
consists of two noncoms and five especially picked men, establishes radio communication
with the German Air Force planes and guides them in, using a powerful transmitter. If
there is a hitch in establishing radio contact, smoke signals are used more often than
identification panels.
The Germans are now well aware that if parachute troops or other air-borne troops are
to be employed successfully, well-coordinated air support is a necessity.