With German antitank activity coming increasingly into the spotlight, these new notes
on enemy antitank tactics have a special significance. Moreover, it must be expected that
such measures will become even more vigorous as the threat to the German homeland grows.
U.S. combat experiences in Italy and the interrogation of German officers have yielded fresh
information about German antitank tactics, which today are playing a more important part
than ever in the enemy's stubborn defensive fighting. The following tactical notes deal
with the antitank company, the bazooka and grenade-discharger squads, and ground-mount
antitank guns, tanks, and self-propelled artillery in the withdrawal. In addition, a new
German technique of preparing delaying positions is discussed and illustrated. The latter
information comes from a U.S. armored division now fighting in Germany.
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A German two-man bazooka team firing on U.S. tanks. |
THE ANTITANK COMPANY
Companies of the German division antitank battalion, as well as the regimental 14th Company, are
employed in support of the infantry regiments, but their orders for deployment normally
come from the antitank battalion headquarters, rather than from the regiment. The Germans
believe that this procedure ensures a higher degree of coordination in the antitank
defense throughout the division sector. However, the following tactical principles are
followed by companies of both types.
The guns are brought into an assembly area, and the company and platoon commanders go forward to
make a detailed reconnaissance of firing positions. If the company commander has had
enough time, he will have made a preliminary survey of the entire sector, and will have
prepared a map designating areas as Panzersicher (tank-proof), Panzergefährdet (difficult
for tanks), or Panzermöglich (good tank terrain). The over-all allotment of
antitank guns will have been made on the basis of this map, with the object of covering
those areas designated as Panzermöglich. Great care is taken with the siting
of each gun; whenever possible, this is done by the platoon commander.
The caliber of the guns determines the nature of the positions which are chosen. The Germans
stipulate that the 50-mm antitank gun must be sited in defilade and must fire to the flanks. This
is why the Germans choose such positions as the reverse slopes of hills and the reverse edges of
small woods. Houses are avoided, on the principle that they attract too much artillery
fire. The Germans also prefer flanking fire for their 75-mm antitank guns, but
the U.S. and British practice of advancing with infantry in the lead and tanks
following in support makes this difficult to achieve. And since the Germans believe that
these 75's can pierce the front armor of Allied tanks at ranges up to 2,000 yards, the guns
usually are sited to fire forward, and are well camouflaged instead of being defiladed. Guns of
all calibers are sited in depth, at varying distances behind the main line of resistance, depending
on the situation and the terrain. Invariably, the guns have infantry in front of them for
local protection. The positions are arranged so that the guns can support each other, each
gun covering positions from which other guns might be attacked by Allied tanks in hull-down
positions.
The enemy's normal practice has been to withdraw the company's prime movers to lines
about half a mile to a mile behind the gun positions, but, because of Allied heavy
artillery superiority, this is no longer possible. The more usual procedure now
is to send back all but one prime mover out of range of artillery fire. The remaining
prime mover serves for any local changes of position which prove necessary. Since such
changes of position are likely to be fairly frequent, it is standard enemy practice to
prepare alternate positions for the guns as soon as the original positions have been
prepared. Of course, a company with only one prime mover forward is not able to
undertake a sudden withdrawal. (If the probable necessity for a withdrawal is
foreseen, the prime movers are kept near the guns, and are disposed in whatever
cover can be found.)
If the company makes a planned withdrawal, assembly areas as well as new lines of
resistance are reconnoitered to the rear of the initial positions. The guns then
withdraw singly, under cover of the remaining weapons.
BAZOOKA AND GRENADE-DISCHARGER SQUADS
Bazooka and grenade-discharger squads are allotted to those infantry companies whose
sectors are considered most likely to be attacked by tanks. The bazooka is regarded
as a relatively static weapon, to be fired from a prepared position, whereas the
grenade discharger is regarded as a mobile reserve weapon, and usually is held
back at the Antitank Company command post.
Wherever possible, bazookas are used in groups of three, and are sited in a V with
its prongs toward the opposition. This permits at least two weapons to engage a tank
approaching from any direction. The individual rocket launcher is emplaced in
a V-shaped pit, with the prongs pointing toward the opposition. The
weapon is carried to either end of the V, according to the direction from which
the tank to be engaged is approaching. Having loaded the weapon, the loader takes
shelter in the opposite arm of the V, to avoid the back-flash of the rocket. He
usually is armed with a submachine gun, and is responsible for the ground protection
of the position. In the general defense plan of the company, bazooka sections have
the mission of defending narrow tank lanes and defiladed approaches. The antitank
guns cover the open areas of attack.
A "FIRE TEAM" IN THE WITHDRAWAL
Ground-mount antitank guns, tanks, and self-propelled artillery frequently
constitute a "fire team" in German withdrawal actions. The ground-mount antitank
guns are sited singly, in groups of two or three, in positions permitting all-around
defense. Wire entanglements and minefields surround these positions, and infantry in
company or platoon strength is maintained in the immediate vicinity. The infantry
stays close to the road, and their positions are planned for ready withdrawal. For this
reason the infantry engage mostly with frontal fire, and fire only a few
rounds before pulling back. Small groups of tanks deploy on the flanks of their
position, serving both as protection for the antitank guns and as an incentive to
hostile armor to deploy similarly. In retreat, these tanks engage the hostile
armor and afford time for the ground-mount weapons to retire to their next position.
The mission of the self-propelled guns in an action of this kind is to remain in the
rear, between the antitank guns in the center and the armor on the flanks. The self-propelled
guns provide fire support, changing position continually and avoiding a direct engagement
with the hostile armor. The Germans consider them especially valuable in helping antitank
guns to defend a road block. By changing their positions so often, the self-propelled guns
place interdictory fire of heavy caliber on the obstacle area without endangering themselves
to any appreciable extent.
FAILURE OF A TACTIC
A prisoner declared that the antitank company never was used in support of advancing
tanks; its chief mission was to attack Allied tanks and cover the German retreat.
The three guns of a platoon were staggered in the following manner:
In theory, the No. 1 gun was to start firing so as to attract return fire from
the hostile tanks. As soon as it was feasible to do so, the No. 1 gun was to
change position to the rear. In the meantime, the No. 2 gun was to fire in
order to attract the opposition's attention. As soon as the Allied tanks' fire
was directed toward the No. 2 gun, that gun was supposed to cease firing and
move to the rear, leaving the No. 3 gun to take over until the No. 1 gun
was in position and ready to start firing again.
In actual practice, however, this system seldom worked. Fire on advancing tanks
was opened at 400 yards: the prisoner considered this range much too short to
permit a successful change of position as outlined in the theory. Since the
prisoner was captured by advancing Allied infantry because he had been
unable to move his gun to the rear quickly enough, his contention seems
pretty reasonable.
No spare barrels were carried by the enemy, and only the gun sight was used. The
prisoner's platoon once had a range finder calibrated up to 10,000 meters, but
the prisoner had never seen it in action. Fire control was independent for each
gun, and was handled by the noncom in charge, who relied on field glasses.
In the prisoner's opinion, the following ranges for the 75-mm antitank guns were
the most effective:
Against tanks or other moving targets | | 100 yards |
Against attacking infantry | | 1,000 yards |
Against strongpoints | | 1,200 yards |
Against houses | | 1,500 yards |
A DELAYING POSITION
In recent weeks a U.S. armored division has been encountering German delaying
positions designed to destroy the leading tanks of an armored column and to
cause confusion and delay. One type of set-up in particular has been encountered
repeatedly, and evidence shows that the Germans have been practicing and perfecting
the technique very studiously indeed.
As shown in the illustration, a covered and perfectly camouflaged foxhole
for a two-man bazooka team normally is dug in a semicircular pattern around
the corner of a house or other building anywhere from 5 to 50 yards off a
road. A camouflaged escape trench leads from the rear of the bazooka
emplacement to any nearby place of concealment, such as garden shrubbery,
outbuildings, or woods. Machine guns are placed in a V, with the prongs of
the V about 300 to 400 yards away from the road and facing the direction
from which an Allied approach is expected.
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A representative German delaying position. |
When an advancing Allied column is preceded by a dismounted point, fire is
withheld until the bazooka team can be certain of knocking out the leading
vehicles.
When the bazooka fires, all the machine guns open up on the remainder of the
column, not so much to cause casualties as to create confusion and to make it
difficult for the Allied force to tell the spot from which the bazooka fire
has come. In fact, the Germans rely on a combination of factors—the excellent
camouflage of the positions and the escape trench, besides the confusion created by
the cross-firing machine guns—to make it difficult for Allied soldiers to
determine the points from which the resistance originates.