[Lone Sentry: German Antitank Tactics]
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"More Notes of Antitank Tactics" from Intelligence Bulletin, February 1945

[Intelligence Bulletin Cover: February 1945]  
The following report on German antitank tactics was printed in the February 1945 issue of the Intelligence Bulletin. At this stage of the war, German antitank defenses were increasingly based on the Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust.

[DISCLAIMER: The following text is taken from the U.S. War Department Intelligence Bulletin publication. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate. No attempt has been made to update or correct the text. Any views or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the website.]

 
MORE NOTES ON ANTITANK TACTICS

With German antitank activity coming increasingly into the spotlight, these new notes on enemy antitank tactics have a special significance. Moreover, it must be expected that such measures will become even more vigorous as the threat to the German homeland grows.

U.S. combat experiences in Italy and the interrogation of German officers have yielded fresh information about German antitank tactics, which today are playing a more important part than ever in the enemy's stubborn defensive fighting. The following tactical notes deal with the antitank company, the bazooka and grenade-discharger squads, and ground-mount antitank guns, tanks, and self-propelled artillery in the withdrawal. In addition, a new German technique of preparing delaying positions is discussed and illustrated. The latter information comes from a U.S. armored division now fighting in Germany.

[A German two-man bazooka team firing on U.S. tanks.]
A German two-man bazooka team firing on U.S. tanks.

THE ANTITANK COMPANY

Companies of the German division antitank battalion, as well as the regimental 14th Company, are employed in support of the infantry regiments, but their orders for deployment normally come from the antitank battalion headquarters, rather than from the regiment. The Germans believe that this procedure ensures a higher degree of coordination in the antitank defense throughout the division sector. However, the following tactical principles are followed by companies of both types.

The guns are brought into an assembly area, and the company and platoon commanders go forward to make a detailed reconnaissance of firing positions. If the company commander has had enough time, he will have made a preliminary survey of the entire sector, and will have prepared a map designating areas as Panzersicher (tank-proof), Panzergefährdet (difficult for tanks), or Panzermöglich (good tank terrain). The over-all allotment of antitank guns will have been made on the basis of this map, with the object of covering those areas designated as Panzermöglich. Great care is taken with the siting of each gun; whenever possible, this is done by the platoon commander.

The caliber of the guns determines the nature of the positions which are chosen. The Germans stipulate that the 50-mm antitank gun must be sited in defilade and must fire to the flanks. This is why the Germans choose such positions as the reverse slopes of hills and the reverse edges of small woods. Houses are avoided, on the principle that they attract too much artillery fire. The Germans also prefer flanking fire for their 75-mm antitank guns, but the U.S. and British practice of advancing with infantry in the lead and tanks following in support makes this difficult to achieve. And since the Germans believe that these 75's can pierce the front armor of Allied tanks at ranges up to 2,000 yards, the guns usually are sited to fire forward, and are well camouflaged instead of being defiladed. Guns of all calibers are sited in depth, at varying distances behind the main line of resistance, depending on the situation and the terrain. Invariably, the guns have infantry in front of them for local protection. The positions are arranged so that the guns can support each other, each gun covering positions from which other guns might be attacked by Allied tanks in hull-down positions.

The enemy's normal practice has been to withdraw the company's prime movers to lines about half a mile to a mile behind the gun positions, but, because of Allied heavy artillery superiority, this is no longer possible. The more usual procedure now is to send back all but one prime mover out of range of artillery fire. The remaining prime mover serves for any local changes of position which prove necessary. Since such changes of position are likely to be fairly frequent, it is standard enemy practice to prepare alternate positions for the guns as soon as the original positions have been prepared. Of course, a company with only one prime mover forward is not able to undertake a sudden withdrawal. (If the probable necessity for a withdrawal is foreseen, the prime movers are kept near the guns, and are disposed in whatever cover can be found.)

If the company makes a planned withdrawal, assembly areas as well as new lines of resistance are reconnoitered to the rear of the initial positions. The guns then withdraw singly, under cover of the remaining weapons.

BAZOOKA AND GRENADE-DISCHARGER SQUADS

Bazooka and grenade-discharger squads are allotted to those infantry companies whose sectors are considered most likely to be attacked by tanks. The bazooka is regarded as a relatively static weapon, to be fired from a prepared position, whereas the grenade discharger is regarded as a mobile reserve weapon, and usually is held back at the Antitank Company command post.

Wherever possible, bazookas are used in groups of three, and are sited in a V with its prongs toward the opposition. This permits at least two weapons to engage a tank approaching from any direction. The individual rocket launcher is emplaced in a V-shaped pit, with the prongs pointing toward the opposition. The weapon is carried to either end of the V, according to the direction from which the tank to be engaged is approaching. Having loaded the weapon, the loader takes shelter in the opposite arm of the V, to avoid the back-flash of the rocket. He usually is armed with a submachine gun, and is responsible for the ground protection of the position. In the general defense plan of the company, bazooka sections have the mission of defending narrow tank lanes and defiladed approaches. The antitank guns cover the open areas of attack.

[Bazookas are used in groups of three, and are sited in a V with its prongs toward the opposition.]

A "FIRE TEAM" IN THE WITHDRAWAL

Ground-mount antitank guns, tanks, and self-propelled artillery frequently constitute a "fire team" in German withdrawal actions. The ground-mount antitank guns are sited singly, in groups of two or three, in positions permitting all-around defense. Wire entanglements and minefields surround these positions, and infantry in company or platoon strength is maintained in the immediate vicinity. The infantry stays close to the road, and their positions are planned for ready withdrawal. For this reason the infantry engage mostly with frontal fire, and fire only a few rounds before pulling back. Small groups of tanks deploy on the flanks of their position, serving both as protection for the antitank guns and as an incentive to hostile armor to deploy similarly. In retreat, these tanks engage the hostile armor and afford time for the ground-mount weapons to retire to their next position.

The mission of the self-propelled guns in an action of this kind is to remain in the rear, between the antitank guns in the center and the armor on the flanks. The self-propelled guns provide fire support, changing position continually and avoiding a direct engagement with the hostile armor. The Germans consider them especially valuable in helping antitank guns to defend a road block. By changing their positions so often, the self-propelled guns place interdictory fire of heavy caliber on the obstacle area without endangering themselves to any appreciable extent.

FAILURE OF A TACTIC

A prisoner declared that the antitank company never was used in support of advancing tanks; its chief mission was to attack Allied tanks and cover the German retreat.

The three guns of a platoon were staggered in the following manner:

[The three guns of a platoon were staggered in the following manner.]

In theory, the No. 1 gun was to start firing so as to attract return fire from the hostile tanks. As soon as it was feasible to do so, the No. 1 gun was to change position to the rear. In the meantime, the No. 2 gun was to fire in order to attract the opposition's attention. As soon as the Allied tanks' fire was directed toward the No. 2 gun, that gun was supposed to cease firing and move to the rear, leaving the No. 3 gun to take over until the No. 1 gun was in position and ready to start firing again.

In actual practice, however, this system seldom worked. Fire on advancing tanks was opened at 400 yards: the prisoner considered this range much too short to permit a successful change of position as outlined in the theory. Since the prisoner was captured by advancing Allied infantry because he had been unable to move his gun to the rear quickly enough, his contention seems pretty reasonable.

No spare barrels were carried by the enemy, and only the gun sight was used. The prisoner's platoon once had a range finder calibrated up to 10,000 meters, but the prisoner had never seen it in action. Fire control was independent for each gun, and was handled by the noncom in charge, who relied on field glasses.

In the prisoner's opinion, the following ranges for the 75-mm antitank guns were the most effective:

Against tanks or other moving targets     100 yards
Against attacking infantry 1,000 yards
Against strongpoints1,200 yards
Against houses1,500 yards

A DELAYING POSITION

In recent weeks a U.S. armored division has been encountering German delaying positions designed to destroy the leading tanks of an armored column and to cause confusion and delay. One type of set-up in particular has been encountered repeatedly, and evidence shows that the Germans have been practicing and perfecting the technique very studiously indeed.

As shown in the illustration, a covered and perfectly camouflaged foxhole for a two-man bazooka team normally is dug in a semicircular pattern around the corner of a house or other building anywhere from 5 to 50 yards off a road. A camouflaged escape trench leads from the rear of the bazooka emplacement to any nearby place of concealment, such as garden shrubbery, outbuildings, or woods. Machine guns are placed in a V, with the prongs of the V about 300 to 400 yards away from the road and facing the direction from which an Allied approach is expected.

[A representative German delaying position.]
A representative German delaying position.

When an advancing Allied column is preceded by a dismounted point, fire is withheld until the bazooka team can be certain of knocking out the leading vehicles.

When the bazooka fires, all the machine guns open up on the remainder of the column, not so much to cause casualties as to create confusion and to make it difficult for the Allied force to tell the spot from which the bazooka fire has come. In fact, the Germans rely on a combination of factors—the excellent camouflage of the positions and the escape trench, besides the confusion created by the cross-firing machine guns—to make it difficult for Allied soldiers to determine the points from which the resistance originates.

 

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