Pvt. Droop Has Missed The War!, War Department Pamphlet No. 21-10.
Details and illustrations from a U.S. Naval Intelligence 1943 report on the Russian battleship Sevastopol:
BATTLESHIP SEVASTOPOL
GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS
ARMOR
The armor belt is about 15 feet wide, five feet of it being below the water line, of uniform thickness; there is a second 3″ or 4″ internal belt from 11 feet inboard above the protective deck extending between it and the barbettes. The space between the main and internal belts is divided up into water tight compartments.
ARMAMENT
The port plates above each gun are in the form of a hinged flap, allowing each 12″ gun to elevate to 25° maximum.
Arcs of fire: end triple 12″ turrets is 310° central turrets, 130° on each beam; the after 4.7″ gun, 90° the other 4.7″ guns, 85°.
Main battery guns in number 2 and number 3 turrets have been replaced by guns of a “higher caliber”, reports indicate.
Number of torpedo tubes: 4 18″ submerged.
GENERAL
This unit is reported to be most unhealthy, unsanitary and badly ventilated.
The Sevastopol proceeded from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea in 1930 in company with the overage light cruiser Profintern. Her general condition, at that time was reported to be unfit and the official explanation of her remaining in the Black Sea was that she could not face the return voyage.
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES
At long range on the surface, this vessel bears a faint resemblance to the Japanese battleship of the FUSO Class.
The following combat report by the 258th Field Artillery Battalion described the effect of short-range 155-mm artillery fire against the pillboxes of the Siegfried Line.
HEADQUARTERS, 258TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO 230, U.S. Army
5 October 1944SUBJECT: Destruction of concrete pillboxes by short range fire from M12, 155mm Gun, SP.
TO: Commanding General, XIX Corps, APO 270, U.S. Army1. Between 26 September 1944 and 2 October 1944 this battalion was assigned to the mission of methodical destruction of all pillboxes which could be located on the front or immediate flanks of the impending attack on the Siegfried Line by the 30th Division.
2. During this period intensive aerial and ground reconnaissance, in conjunction with aerial photo study, revealed 49 pillboxes as potential observable targets.
3. Of this number 43 were attacked by short range M12 fire, 1 by direct fire and 2 by 3″ guns of Co A, 823d TD Bn. M12 adjusted using fuze delay, switching to T105 fuze on obtaining the first target shot. The TD company commander fired using one gun, direct laying, firing both HE with fuze CB, and armor piercing shot. Evidence of penetration was obtained on all 46 targets above. For details of each mission, see accompanying annex.
4. Firing was terminated only on evidence that a penetration has been obtained. It has not yet been possible to verify by close-up examination of the targets whether penetration was accomplished in every instance.
The Hungarian National Film Archive has placed an extenive collection of newsreels from 1931-1943 online at Filmhíradók Online.
In 2005, with support from the Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications, the Hungarian National Film Archive digitalised a part of its collection. In addition to 115 feature films, 597 newsreels from the years between 1931 and 1943 were digitalised, including the first talking newsreel from 1931. The films were added to the special collection of the National Audio-Visual Archive (NAVA).
Combat Lessons, No. 3 described the fighting on Sicily between U.S. Sherman tanks, Panzer IIIs and Panzer IVs of the Herman Goring Panzer Division, and Tigers of sPzAbt. 504. The Herman Goring Panzer Division lost heavily in the fighting around the Sicily beachheads in July, and sPzAbt. 504 suffered the disastrous loss of 14 of its 17 Tigers.
Tank Operations, Remarks by a Senior American Officer, Sicily: “On the morning of 12 July, at least a company of German tanks with numerous Mark VIs (Tigers) attached, attacked down the Niscemi Road. There was an observation post for our artillery just south of this road from which fire was placed on the tanks with great accuracy by an infantry battalion commander who was the only observer present. At the time he brought the fire down on the tanks they were within 300 yards of his position.
“While this was going on, a company of our Sherman tanks encountered enemy tanks and infantry moving west on the Gela-Ragusa Road and a sharp fight ensued. The Germans lost two Mark VIs, while we lost four Mark IVs (Shermans). The German tanks attacked ahead of the infantry, and without using smoke or reconnaissance. They were stopped by fire from our tanks and artillery.
“In both attacks the Germans followed the roads and were less successful than on the preceding day when they had been deployed and operated cross-country.
“On the Miscemi Road I saw four German Mark IV tanks and a number of Mark VIs and Mark IIIs which had been knocked out. Three of the Mark VIs had been stopped initially by a hit on a track. Another Mark VI had been ditched under conditions that indicated very poor driving and then put out of action by artillery shell fire while immobilized.”
Penalty of Carelessness: “The American tanks lost deserved their fate because they deliberately violated long-standing instructions. They had apparently moved down the valley until they reached a road and then successively moved out on the road to get a view. As soon as they got on the road they came under fire from German 88s at 1500 yards range.
“Had these tanks halted under cover on either side of the road and reconnoitered on foot, they would certainly have discovered the German guns which were and still are in plain view.“
Instructions for digging defensive positions for AA halftracks from “Antiaircraft Artillery Notes,” HQ ETO, No. 8, December 1944:
Digging in Half-Tracks
Source: AA Section, Headquarters Twelfth Army GroupThe principle of digging in equipment is one which all AAA combat units understand and practice. Some units have learned from experience that the deeper one is dug in, consistent with the field of fire to perform the assigned mission, the better protection the crew and equipment are afforded against artillery and mortar fire. As an example of the policy that it pays to dig in deep, Figure 1 shows the plan practiced by the 554th AAA AW Bn (M). Approximately eight hours is required to prepare the emplacement, including sandbagging. This battalion, commanded by Lt Colonel L. V. Linderer, has seen continuous action since arriving on the continent 18 June, being attached to XIX Corps until 5 November when it was attached to the 29th Inf. Div. During this period the battalion has been subjected to mortar and artillery fire on numerous occasions, and to date has suffered no fatal personnel casualties due to this fire.
Notes:(a) Minimum thickness of revetment.(b) The depth of emplacement and heighth or sandbags will depend entirely on the terrain.(c) Log or plank for track to rest on.(d) Floor of emplacement slopes to the center and front to sump hole where water will drain and can be bailed out.
Updates on the MiniArt website for two of their latest 1/35th scale plastic kits: 35061: Soviet Field Kitchen PK-42 and 35086: German Civilians.