Don’t Scare Replacements

From “Combat Lessons” No. 7 comes the following notes on leadership and replacement orientation:

Replacement Instruction—the Wrong Kind

A Lieutenant comments on his ominous introduction to front-line existence: “On my way to the front as an officer replacement, I met several individuals who had come back from the line. Invariably they recounted to me their hair-raising experiences—their outfits had been ‘wiped out,’ or ‘pinned down for days’; ‘officers didn’t have a dog’s chance of survival,’ etc. One platoon sergeant went statistical on me; he said his platoon had lost 16 officers in one 2-week period. I expected confidently that I would be blown to bits within 15 minutes after my arrival at the front.

Do Not Scare Replacements: WW2 Combat Lessons

Don\’t Scare Hell out of Replacements

“Later experience has shown me that enlisted men who come in as replacements are subjected to similar morale-breaking tales. I have tried to get my old men to give the new replacement a break by being careful not to exaggerate their battle experiences or in any way distort the picture of front-line existence. Give the new men a common-sense introduction to the combat zone and there will be fewer men going on sick call before an attack.”

Noncoms and privates of Company “K,” 11th Infantry, ETO, draw attention to the same problem: “Our replacements come to us filled with tenseness and dread caused by stories they have heard in the rear. Special instructors from the front should be used at replacement centers to talk the new men out of this unnecessary panic. Of course, the soundest remedy is to have the replacements occupy a defensive position for a time, but even then the kind of treatment they are given upon arrival at the front makes a big difference in the amount of good they will do their new outfit.”

Comment: Company commanders and platoon leaders should meet, orient, and indoctrinate all replacements so that they gain an authentic picture of current battle conditions. This should be done even though battle indoctrination has been started in replacement centers. Knowing what to expect, even when the expected is bad, is better than not knowing and consequently imagining the worst.

 

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Japanese Type 1 Ho-Ki Armored Personnel Carrier

The Japanese produced a limited number of the innovative Type 1 Ho-Ki, fully-tracked armored personnel carriers. The Ho-Ki APC was developed in 1941, but full-scale production did not start until 1944. A limited number of Ho-Ki were deployed with Japanese reinforcements to the Philippines in 1944, and several Ho-Ki were captured by the U.S. on Leyte and Luzon.

From Enemy on Luzon: An Intelligence Summary:

Although not encountered before our return to the Philippines, several of these vehicles were captured there by U.S. forces. One was recovered on Leyte, and at least four were found on Luzon.

Japanese Type 1 Ho-Ki APC Armored Personnel Carrier

Full Track Personnel Carrier

The vehicle was full tracked, armored, and powered by a six cylinder air-cooled Diesel engine. The bogie wheels and suspension were similar to those of the Type 95 Light Tank, but the track was both longer and wider than that of the tank. This carrier, 15 feet 9 inches long overall and 6 feet 8 inches wide, was protected with ¼-inch armor on all sides and rear, but was open at the top except for the driver’s compartment. There were doors at the rear and one on each side to permit personnel to leave the carrier rapidly. The driver’s compartment was on the left front of the body and was equipped with metal vision slits for driving under fire. The vehicle had four speeds forward in addition to high and low range transfer case and was equipped with a spring-mounted towing pintle.

Being much lighter than the Type 95 Light Tank, employing an engine of similar power, and having roughly the same track contact, the vehicle gave excellent cross-country performance. The addition of the transfer case increased the range and power as compared with a light tank. U.S. combat troops found these vehicles to be highly satisfactory artillery prime movers.

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Ordnance Assembly of Crated GMC CCKW Trucks

Ordnance WW2 Mediterranean Theater Operations The following pictures of uncrating and assembly of GMC CCKW trucks appeared in Ordnance Activities in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, November 1942 – June 1945 published by the Ordnance Department. The GMC CCKW 2½ ton 6×6 cargo truck was typically shipped in crates as shown below, and assembled by Ordnance personnel in theater.

Through North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the Ordnance Service successfully supported the Allied forces as they slugged their way to victory in the MTO. In two and one half years of Ordnance Service in MTOUSA, the shops repaired 1,307,382 small arms; renovated 249,979 rounds of artillery ammunition; assembled 126,669 vehicles and did repair work on 341,048 vehicles of all types; repaired 247,242 pieces of artillery; and repaired 846,863 tires. Ordnance provided critical transportation throughout the theater, and the unpacking and assembly of crated trucks was a key part of that effort.

 
GMC CCKW 2½ ton Truck Crated WW2

This is how a 2½ ton truck is received in case you didn\’t know.

GMC CCKW 2 1/2 ton Truck Begins to Take Shape in WW2 Ordnance Center

A GMC begins to take shape.

WW2 Ordnance Final Assembly of GMC CCKW Truck

As the body goes onto the chassis, and after it has had a test run, another truck will be ready for issue to the using arms.

 

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Fallschirmjäger and the Battle for Crete

Photographs of the German Fallschirmjäger airborne invasion of Crete in May 1941. The German attack on Crete was the first major airborne offensive in WWII. [All photographs Bundesarchiv via Wikimedia, Creative Commons CC-BY-SA.]

Fallschirmjäger advance during the invasion of Crete, May 1941

Fallschirmjäger in characteristic jump smocks advance during the invasion of Crete, May 1941. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-166-0508-27 / Weixler, Franz Peter / CC-BY-SA)

Crete (Kreta) Fallschirmjaeger, WW2 Airborne Forces

Lightly-equipped Fallschirmjäger move through the courtyard of a house during the Battle for Crete. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-166-0508-14 / Weixler, Franz Peter / CC-BY-SA)

Fallschirmjäger Officer with MP40 Submachine Gun

A Fallschirmjäger officer armed with MP-40 submachine gun sprints across a field toward cover in Crete. Note the MP-40 folding stock and officer’s map case. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-166-0508-28 / Weixler, Franz Peter / CC-BY-SA)

37-mm Antitank Gun dropped by Triple Parachute over Crete

A 3.7 cm antitank gun is dropped by parachutes over Crete. Throughout the Crete battle, the Fallschirmjäger were hindered by a lack of artillery and other heavy weapons. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 141-0853 / Unknown / CC-BY-SA)

Wrecked and Destroyed German Junkers Ju 52 Transports on Crete

Wrecked German Junkers Ju 52 transports on Crete. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-166-0512-39 / Weixel / CC-BY-SA)

 

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G.I. Nightmare

Test your aircraft recognition skills and knowledge of WW2 German aircraft with this quiz from “Antiaircraft Artillery Notes,” No. 13, January 1945.

G.I. Nightmare - WW2 German Aircraft Recognition

Answers after the page break.

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The Century Tours France

100th Infantry Division Century Tours France WW2

“The Century Tours France” from the G.I. Stories booklet: 100: The Story of the Century published by the Information and Education Division, ETOUSA in 1945.

 

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Warning to Observation Post Kibitzers

From “Combat Lessons” No. 6:

Says a Captain of a Field Artillery Battalion, France: “Well-meaning infantrymen who crowd about the OP to observe the results of the firing or to steal a look through the BC telescope should be warned that they are inviting fire from the enemy. OP’s are high on the priority list of enemy targets. The importance of OP camouflage discipline cannot be overemphasized.”

OP - Observation Post - Artillery

“OP\’s are high on the priority list of enemy targets.”

 

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First Army AAA Versus the Luftwaffe

Operational antiaircraft report from “Antiaircraft Artillery Notes,” No. 8, December 13, 1944. This attack was mounted by the Luftwaffe’s Jagdgeschwader 4 (JG 4). The aircraft displayed the black-white-black bands of JG 4.

SUBJECT: First Army AAA Versus the Luftwaffe.
SOURCE: AA Section, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group.

a. “Ich habe niemals etwas ähnliches gesehen!” meaning “I’ve never seen anything like it.” This statement by a captured GAF pilot epitomizes the disastrous effort of the Luftwaffe to match its air skill against First Army AAA on the afternoon of 3 December. In this action, the heaviest daylight effort since 5 October, 70 enemy aircraft operated over the front in the First Army area. AAA claim 41 enemy aircraft destroyed and 23 enemy aircraft probably destroyed.

b. The enemy started the attack at 1359 hours when approximately 2 Gruppen entered the First Army area in the VII Corps zone, swung south through the V Corps zone to enter the VIII Corps zone, then reversed to retrace the route, and leave again at the northern part of VII Corps zone. The action lasted for approximately 45 minutes. The enemy chose to operate in concentrated numbers on an afternoon when weather had grounded all our fighters, a fact which the enemy evidently judged would give him freedom in the air to attack targets in the fighting zone and thus slow the threatening ground advance. But the enemy did not reckon with the prepared AAA.

c. The First Army AAA was ready and waiting. The effectiveness of the early warning is demonstrated by the fact that gun crews had four minutes warning of the approach of enemy aircraft. An additional factor in the preparedness was that the area controller had released guns to fire unseen because none of our aircraft were airborne in that area.

d. The cloud ceiling at the time of the action was approximately 1000 feet. The enemy aircraft approached in formations but split up to small individual groups of two’s and three’s before entering the area. The mission assigned was to cover the area “thoroughly and attack any and all targets of opportunity. In attempting to carry out this mission, each aircraft took individual action; more often than not this consisted of violent evasive action to avoid AAA fire. The enemy planes darted in and out of the cloud cover, and even attempted to fly down valleys to avoid our flak. In a determined effort to complete the mission the planes strafed and bombed for 45 minutes, all the time in the face of devastating AAA fire.

e. Fifteen (15) AAA battalions participated in the action. It is not possible to tabulate the claims of each unit at present as claims in many instances are overlapping and the AAA intelligence officers, the air force crash intelligence teams, and the interrogation teams are working overtime to segregate the true facts of the downed planes. Many of the observed coordinates of crashed aircraft are in heavily mined areas or behind the enemy lines and thus are not readily accessible. However, as of 8 December, seventeen (17) crashed aircraft had been located, together with nine live pilots. Units participating in this action were: 116th AAA Gun Bn (M), 555th AAA AW Bn (M), 376th AAA AW Bn (M), 552nd AAA AW Bn (M), 486th AAA AW Bn (SP), 474th AAA AW Bn (SP), 462nd AAA AW Bn (M), 460th AAA AW Bn (M), 387th AAA AW Bn (SP), 438th AAA AW Bn (M), 461st AAA AW Bn (M), 197th AAA AW Bn (SP), 103rd AAA AW Bn (M), 445th AAA AW Bn (M), 377th AAA AW Bn (M)

f. The interrogation of one captured pilot, an extremely experienced one having seen much action on other fronts, produced the following facts: He was shot down by flak after his plane had been hit four times – in the tail, fuselage, wing, and engine. When flak was mentioned, he became very agitated and cursed our AAA fire as being too intense and too accurate. He said that evasive tactics of skidding his plane and jinking, which had worked so successfully on other fronts, was useless here, as evidenced by his being hit and downed. When the flak opened up, it appeared to him that the whole mountainside was alive with fire. He had “never seen anything like it.”

g. The following facts emerging from this action are interesting to note:

(1) Some planes were painted with a replica of the invasion stripes on the fuselage between the cockpit and stabilizer. There were three stripes – black, white, black – each 10-11 inches wide.

(2) Me 109 G-6 and Me 109 G-14 types participated. The Me 109 G-14 had a 20mm cannon mounted between the engine blocks.

(3) First Army policy of preventative maintenance was demonstrated by the fact that the 197th AAA AW Bn (SP) had 36 half-tracks in action without a single malfunction of any type.

(4) The 116th AAA Gun Bn (M) fired some rounds of pre-cut fuzes in gun control at low flying strafing planes. It is reported that one plane was destroyed by this method of fire control. This battalion claims four (4) planes destroyed by unseen fire control.

 

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Death of a Tiger Tank

Interesting WWII newspaper correspondent’s report from Tunisia in April 1943:

Death of Tiger Tank

By Noland Norgaard

With the British 8th Army Beyond Sousse, Tunisia—(Wednesday)—Delayed—(AP)

The crew of a German Mark VI Tiger tank hastily set fire to the heavily armored machine and fled on foot when a spunky British armored car charged with its only machine gun blazing.

The story of the unequal encounter and its surprising ending was told today by a sergeant from Bath, the commander of the seven ton car which took on an opponent nearly nine times its size as the British 8th Army charged north through Tunisia.

“We poked the nose of our car over the edge of a hill and saw a Mark VI sitting there with its heavy gun trained on our troops to the east,” the sergeant recalled. “We left our other cars and skirted around to the other side and then came at the tank and directed our machine gun against the crew, who for some reason had dismounted from their vehicle.

“Two of the four crewmen got back into the tank and set it afire. They must, have some device ready for such a purpose because they were able to destroy it very quickly. The fire seemed to come from the motor instead of the spot where they were.

“Then the Germans jumped out again and hit the ground to avoid our fire. We captured them, and another of our cars captured the other two, who tried to get away.”

A similar incident between an M8 armored car and a Tiger tank during the Battle of the Bulge was reported in “The Battle at St. Vith, Belgium, 17-23 December, 1944: An Historical Example of Armor in the Defense” published by U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 1966.

While the northern and eastern flanks had been heavily engaged, the northeastern sector (Troop A, 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron; Company A, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion; Troop B, 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron) had been rather quiet. The only excitement there had been when an M8 armored car from Troop B destroyed a Tiger tank. The armored car had been in a concealed position near the boundary of Troop B, 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Company A, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion, when the Tiger approached the lines at right angles to move along a trail in front of the main line of resistance. As the tank passed the armored car, the latter slipped out of position and started up the trail behind the Tiger, accelerating in an attempt to close. At the same moment the German tank commander saw the M8, and started traversing his gun to bear on it. It was a race between the Americans, who were attempting to close so that their 37-mm gun would be effective on the Tiger’s thin rear armor, and the Germans, who were desperately striving to bring their 88 to bear. Rapidly the M8 closed to 25 yards, and quickly pumped in three rounds; the lumbering Tiger stopped and shuddered; there was a muffled explosion, followed by flames which billowed out of the turret and engine ports, after which the armored car returned to its position. [This action was reported to Major Donald P. Boyer, Jr.. S3, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion, by Captain W. H. Anstey (commanding Company A, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion) who witnessed the engagement.]

Allied soldiers informally referred to any of the German tanks armed with high-velocity guns as “Tigers,” so in both cases the panzers in question may actually be panzers of other types.

 

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Chaff

“Chaff can take it… you can’t! Know chaff and use it!” Ninth Air Force (IX Tactical Air Command) training poster:

Chaff (Radar countermeasure, window or Düppel)

See Also: Flak Traps

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